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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-1757
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LEON HENRY,
Appellant

____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00033-02)
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. Dubois
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2011
Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 26, 2011)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Leon Henry (Leon or Henry) appeals his judgment of sentence following a jury
trial. Because the District Court committed no error, we will affirm.

I
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we review
only briefly the essential facts and procedural history.
In 2003, Leon and his brother Andre Henry (Andre) wanted to purchase firearms,
but could not do so directly because they were convicted felons. Accordingly, they
recruited two women, Tameka Niblack and Starlene Herbert, to act as “straw” purchasers.
In their first attempt to purchase an assault rifle for the Henrys, the women were rebuffed
by a gun store clerk because they did not know how to operate the weapon. Undaunted
by this rejection, the Henrys drove Niblack the next day to a different gun store, where
she successfully purchased a Bushmaster AR-15 rifle, ammunition, and a gun cleaning
kit. During the following week, in two separate transactions, Niblack purchased two
Glock 9mm handguns. Niblack gave all three weapons and accessories to the Henrys.
At trial and during sentencing, the Government introduced evidence that prior to
Niblack‟s purchases, Leon had helped Andre conceal evidence and launder money from
Andre‟s earlier crimes, which included eight robberies of fast food restaurants with a fake
firearm, two robberies of the Pulaski Savings Bank with an AK-47 rifle, and two
attempted carjackings, during one of which Andre shot at a police officer. The
Government also introduced evidence that the Henrys and two conspirators were planning
a third bank robbery at which Leon was to stay outside the bank and act as a sniper if
police arrived, although Leon was eventually acquitted of this conspiracy. Fortunately,
Andre was arrested for violating his parole before a third bank robbery could occur.
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Leon was arrested after Andre and was charged with one count of conspiracy to
make false statements to a federal firearm licensee, and two counts of making such
statements. Andre and five other conspirators were also charged in the indictment, but
those charges are not germane to this appeal. A superseding indictment was filed,
followed by a second superseding indictment charging twenty-eight counts against the
seven defendants. Leon was charged with: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) conspiring to make false statements to a federal
firearm licensee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (3) making false statements to a federal
firearms licensee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A); and (4) conspiracy to commit
armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Following a successful motion to
sever, Leon was tried alone, and the jury found him guilty of the firearms offenses but
acquitted him of conspiracy to commit bank robbery. After a four day sentencing
hearing, the District Court sentenced Leon to 106 months imprisonment.
At sentencing, the Government sought sentencing enhancements under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) for, inter alia, obstruction of justice (USSG §
3C1.1) and possessing or transferring a gun with knowledge, intent or reason to believe it
would be used in a felony offense (USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5)). The Government also moved
for upward departures because Henry engaged in multiple acts of obstruction of justice
and because he threatened a prosecutor. The Government proffered multiple witnesses to
testify in support of these enhancements. The District Court did an admirable job
weighing the voluminous evidence and determining whether each alleged act supported
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an enhancement, departure, or variance.
First, the District Court found that Henry attempted to convince Niblack to stage a
break-in and file a false police report that the guns had been stolen. Supp. App. 321, 334.
The District Court reasonably found that this “was an unlawful attempt to influence a
witness to lie to the police,” which amounted to obstruction of justice pursuant to
application note 4(a) to USSG § 3C1.1. Id. at 334.
Second, the Government presented somewhat equivocal evidence to show that
Leon had, pursuant to an earlier agreement with Andre, gone to the apartment of one of
the straw purchasers to prevent her from testifying by killing her, but that he had
abandoned the plan. The District Court found that this did not amount to an attempt to
obstruct justice and declined to enhance based on the evidence. Id. at 323.
Third, the Government proffered evidence that Leon, at Andre‟s behest,
approached two potential witnesses outside the grand jury room. The Government argued
that this amounted to an attempt to interfere with the grand jury, but the District Court
found that speaking to the witnesses, without any evidence of threats or intimidation,
could not support an enhancement for obstruction of justice. Id. at 325.
Fourth, the Government proffered evidence that Henry had first deliberately
hidden the guns, then, after the police failed to find them, had hidden them again
elsewhere, and finally, once he was in custody, had telephoned a compatriot and
instructed him to hide them in yet a third location. The District Court rejected the
defense‟s argument that simply concealing evidence could not amount to obstruction of
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justice and found that because Henry “took deliberate steps, with knowledge of an
investigation, to conceal the weapons [it] amount[ed] to obstruction of justice.” Id. at
332; see USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(d) (2002).
Fifth, the Government presented evidence that, once he was incarcerated, Henry
spoke to co-defendant and potential witness Herbert through the prison‟s plumbing
system. When Herbert declined to speak with Henry, he told her not to testify and
threatened to poison everyone on her floor in the prison. The District Court found that
this threat constituted obstruction of justice. Supp. App. 336; USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(a)
(2002).
Finally, the Government presented evidence that Henry told another prisoner that
he was planning to kill the Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting his case.
Specifically, Henry told the prisoner (1) that he had read a transcript of his trial during
which, at sidebar, the prosecutor had requested time to take her daughter to the hospital,
and (2) that he intended to use the Bushmaster AR-15 rifle, which the Government had
never found, to kill the prosecutor and her family. Henry‟s prison confidante informed
the prosecutor and testified against Henry at sentencing, and this testimony was
corroborated by another prisoner. Defense counsel argued that because the threat had not
been communicated by Henry to the prosecutor it could not constitute a real threat or an
attempted obstruction of justice. The District Court disagreed. Supp. App. 339.
In sum, the District Court found four acts that could constitute obstruction of
justice—urging Niblack to file a false police report, concealing and re-concealing the
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weapons to hinder the investigation, threatening to poison Herbert‟s prison floor to
prevent her from testifying, and threatening to kill the prosecutor and her family—and
rejected two others—the alleged aborted attempt to kill a witness, and speaking to
potential grand jury witnesses.
After making these findings, the District Court ruled on the applicability of the
various guidelines and enhancements. First, it found that the four-level enhancement
under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) was applicable, for two independent reasons, namely because
Henry
had reason to believe that the weapons for which he is criminally
responsible, the Bushmaster AR-15 and the two Glocks, would be used or
possessed in connection with another felony offense [and also because,]
with respect to the threat on [the prosecutor,] the defendant possessed that
Bushmaster, although it was possessed at the time of the statement
constructively only, he knew where it was . . . the Government didn‟t know
where it was, he possessed that weapon constructively with the intent to
commit another felony offense, that is the murder of [the prosecutor].
Id. at 315.
The District Court also granted a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice
under USSG § 3C1.1 “because of the attempt of the defendant to have a witness make a
false police report.” Id. at 343. It then found that “the separate acts of obstruction, the
concealment of evidence and the threats to co-defendant, warrant[ed] a two-level increase
in offense level, and . . . depart[ed] upward by two levels” for those acts. Id. at 345.
Finally, the District Court addressed the Government‟s motion for an upward
departure for the threats against the prosecutor. The Government argued that this
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warranted a three level upward departure by analogy to USSG § 3A1.2—an enhancement
for an official victim—but the District Court rejected this argument because the
prosecutor was not a victim of Henry‟s offenses of conviction. Nonetheless, the District
Court departed upward an additional two levels based on the threat to the prosecutor. Id.
at 346. At the conclusion of sentencing, the District Court clarified that both upward
departures—for the threat against the prosecutor and the multiple acts of obstruction of
justice—were pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0 which “provides for a departure, „if the Court
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree
not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.‟” Id. at 366
(quoting USSG § 5K2.0 (2002)).
II
On appeal, Henry challenges the District Court‟s application of the two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1 and the two additional twolevel upward departures under USSG § 5K2.0.
We review district court sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, looking first
for procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive reasonableness.
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). We review a district court‟s
legal interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 56168 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). District courts make sentencing-related factual findings by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 307 (3d
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Cir. 2007). Accordingly, “if the asserted procedural error is purely factual, our review is
highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an abuse of discretion only if the
district court‟s findings are clearly erroneous.” Wise, 515 F.3d at 217.
A
Henry argues that the District Court erred by using the threats to the prosecutor as
the basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1. We disagree.
In fact, the District Court did not impose an enhancement for obstruction of justice
under USSG § 3C1.1 based on Henry‟s threat against the prosecutor. Instead, it imposed
a two-level upward departure under USSG § 5K2.0 for that threat. The District Court
explicitly predicated the obstruction of justice enhancement on Henry‟s attempt to
convince Niblack to file a false police report. Supp. App. 339, 343. This was not error.
Nonetheless, Henry argues that the District Court erred because it found that the threat
against the prosecutor could support an obstruction of justice enhancement, even absent
evidence that Henry intended it to be communicated to the prosecutor, thereby
influencing or obstructing her prosecution of him.
We have not addressed whether USSG § 3C1.1 requires a threat to be
communicated to the intended victim or the related question of what constitutes evidence
of intent for the enhancement. Other circuit courts of appeals are split on the issue. See
United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150-51 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
enhancement “requires that the defendant either threaten the codefendant, witness, or
juror in his or her presence or issue the threat in circumstances in which there is some
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likelihood that the codefendant, witness, or juror will learn of the threat.”); United States
v. Searcy, 316 F.3d 550, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2002) (joining the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits in holding that a threat need not be directly communicated to the victim
to support an enhancement). In this appeal, where the enhancement was not even applied
based on the threat, we have no occasion to resolve these questions.
B
Second, Henry argues that the District Court imposed the enhancement for the
threat based on the same conduct which formed the basis of another enhancement, namely
the four-level enhancement for “possess[ing] or transferr[ing] any firearm or ammunition
with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5). This argument fails for
three reasons, two of which are fact-based and one of which is a question of law. First,
the District Court imposed the § 2K2.1 enhancement both because of the threat to the
prosecutor and because Henry had reason to believe that the weapons would be used in
connection with another felony offense, namely another robbery with or by Andre. Supp.
App. 315. Second, possessing or transferring a weapon with knowledge that it will be
used in a felony is not the same conduct as making a threat to use that weapon. Finally,
“[o]nly when the Guidelines explicitly prohibit double counting will it be impermissible
to raise a defendant‟s offense level under one provision when another offense Guideline
already takes into account the same conduct.” Fisher, 502 F.3d at 309. Accordingly, the
District Court did not err in imposing a two-level upward departure under USSG § 5K2.0
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for Henry‟s threat to the prosecutor along with the other enhancements.1
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of
sentence.

Having found no procedural error in the District Court‟s Guidelines calculations,
Henry‟s substantive unreasonableness argument necessarily fails as it is premised on his
claim that his offense level was calculated improperly.
1
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